Abstract-The threat ofnuclear terrorism presents an increasingly urgent and difficult challenge to the United States in the 21st Century. New technologies with improved sensitivity will be needed to identify hidden nuclear weapons in order to protect the United States from this threat. This paper describes a detector under development that will measure the direction and energy ofrecoiling nuclei produced in collisions with neutrons emitted by spontaneous fission from plutonium warheads. Such a detector will have improved sensitivity compared to other neutron detectors due to its ability to determine the direction of approach of the neutrons, thereby reducing significantly the backgrounds due to cosmic ray neutrons.
INTRODUCTION
Much information regarding the production of nuclear power and nuclear weapons is not classified, and is readily available on the internet to any interested person. Uranium is the principal player of this story. It is a very common element. Its average concentration in the earth's crust is about 3 parts per million. There are about 5 million tonnes (1 tonne = 1000 kg) of uranium ore that are economically accessible. Another 35 million tones have reasonable prospects for being mined eventually. It is also possible that the 5 billion tonnes in the earth's oceans may be extractable. The isotopic composition of natural uranium is 99.27% U-238, 0.72% U-235 and 0.005% U-234. U-235 can be induced to undergo nuclear fission by collisions with thermal neutrons (such nuclei are said to be "fissile"), with the subsequent emission of neutrons that can lead to a self-sustaining succession of fission fission reactions, each one of which releases a large amount of kinetic energy. This makes it possible to build energy-producing nuclear power reactors, or nuclear weapons with appallingly destructive capabilities. A nuclear weapon requires a "critical mass" of sufficiently pure fissile nuclei that can produce a rapidly escalating chain reaction. Fissile nuclei include the naturally occurring (but rare) U-235, and those that can be made in nuclear reactors (Pu-239, Pu-241, U-233).
Commercial power plants typically use uranium enriched to 3% U-235. About 80,000 tonnes of spent fuel rods are now stored in cooling pools near the 100 or so nuclear power plants in the United States. There are about 440 nuclear power reactors in the world, in 30 or so countries. Pressurized light water reactors are the most common type, and each typically uses about 100 tonnes of uranium at a given time, and the fuel is useful for several years. A commercial power reactor typically produces about 1000 MW of electrical power, with about twice that amount being produced as useless heat. Nuclear weapons require highly enriched uranium to function. Currently the easiest way of doing this uses high speed gas centrifuges with uranium hexafluoride. This is the technique employed by India and Pakistan to make the material for their nuclear weapons. Emerging technologies include laser isotope separation techniques which can be difficult to detect by intelligence agencies. The bare critical mass of uranium with 94% U235 and 6% U-238 is 52 kg. This increases to 160 kg for 50% U-235, and 800 kg for 20% U-235.
Plutonium is created in explosions of stars, as is uranium, but the half-life of plutonium is too short for it to occur naturally in the earth. It is currently produced in nuclear reactors when U-238, absorbs a neutron, resulting in U-239, which decays in 23 minutes to an isotope of neptunium, Np-239, which decays in about two days to the plutonium isotope Pu-239. Pu-239 has a half life of 24,000 years. Subsequent neutron captures on plutonium produce Pu-240 (half life 6600 years), Pu-241 (14 years) and Pu-242 (373,000 years). A small amount of Pu-238 (88 years half life) is produced in neutron capture reactions starting with U-235. Pu-239 is fissile and is the most favorable isotope of plutonium for the production of nuclear weapons. Weapons grade plutonium (Wpu) is produced from the uranium fuel of reactors after burning for about 3 MWdays/kg (MW refers to the total power produced by the reactor, and kg refers to the mass of uranium fuel), which results in an isotopic composition of 0.01% Pu-238, 93.8% Pu-239, 5.8% Pu-240, 0.3% Pu-241 and 0.02% Pu-242. Nuclear reactors used for power production typically operate up to 40 MWdays/kg, resulting in reactor grade plutonium (Rpu) with the isotopic composition 2% Pu-238, 60% Pu-239, 24% Pu-240, 9% Pu-241 and 5% Pu-242. About 240 kg of plutonium are produced each year by a typical commercial power reactor. Since the Second World War approximately 1200 tonnes of plutonium have been produced.
Although it used to be commonly thought that Wpu was required for the production of nuclear weapons, it is now wellknown that Rpu works quite well [1] , [2] , [3] . In fact, the information that the United States had successfully tested a weapon using Rpu (the plutonium was produced in the United Kingdom) at the Nevada Test Site in 1962 was declassified in 1977 [4] . Differences between Wpu and Rpu with regard to making weapons are described in [2] . The bare sphere critical mass of Wpu is 10 kg (13 kg for Rpu). The heat generated by alpha particle radioactivity of Wpu is 2.3 W/kg (10.5 W/kg for Rpu). At a distance of 1 meter from 6 kg of unshielded material the radiation exposure of Wpu is 5 mrem/hr (30 mrem/hr for Rpu). The neutron emission from spontaneous fission of Pu-240 from Wpu is 661slg (3601slg for Rpu). The extra neutron emission makes for a less effective weapon for Rpu, due to the premature initiation of the chain reaction. Mark's calculations [1] indicated that if a neutron were injected at the worst possible time in the evolution of an explosion, it might reduce the yield of a 20 kton weapon to 1 or 2 ktons.
Rodionov [5] points out that the Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) [6] came to the following conclusions concerning the criminal use of plutonium: "(1) Possible proliferators could produce nuclear explosive devices even from reactor-grade plutonium; a simple design (i.e. implosive systems) would provide a yield from one to a few ktons, while a more modern design could provide a higher yield.
(2) In assessing security threats, it is necessary to understand who is trying to acquire and misuse plutonium. Terrorists might care little about the differences between reactor-grade and weapons-grade plutonium. Small nations would be likely to care more, in the sense of preferring to make weapons from weapons-grade plutonium, if everything else were equal." It is suggested in [5] that a 5 kg weapon with the yield of several tons of TNT could be made with a very crude gun-type implosion system using chemical explosives or even a very strong spring loaded device. The "kill range" of such a device would be the order of one hundred meters.
Several possible nuclear weapon configurations with expected radiation rates are presented in [7] . Weapons grade uranium weapons can be made with negligible gamma and neutron emissions. In particular they would be difficult to detect from their emitted radiations even if they were only a meter or so from radiation detectors. This is due both to their small radioactivity and to the occurrence of large natural backgrounds of radiation. For example a 12 kg weapons grade uranium weapon with tungsten tamper (material surrounding the weapon that reduces the critical mass) will emit about 30 gamma rays per second with an energy of about 1 MeV. But natural background radiation (due to uranium, thorium and potassium in the earth's crust and in building materials) will provide a flux of a few such gamma rays per square centimeter per second (though it should be noted that high precision gamma ray spectroscopy will reduce the background by focusing on those regions of the spectrum characteristic of uranium). The same nuclear weapon would emit about 30 fission neutrons per second. The fission spectrum is peaked at about 1 MeV neutron energy and extends up to several MeV. For comparison, the flux of neutrons in the cosmic rays at sea level is about 100 per square meter per second with energies typically from 1 to 10 MeV. Therefore to detect a highly enriched uranium warhead smuggled across a border would be virtually impossible. It is estimated in [7] that the distance for which gamma ray background equals the signal from such a weapon is about 40 cm, and the corresponding distance for neutrons is 20 cm. It seems the best defense against a terrorist attack with such a device is to stop it at the source: i.e. to guard with extraordinary diligence all such highly enriched materials. It is highly probable that this is in fact being done. Less highly enriched uranium weapons would be quite large and heavy, and might be detectable through muon radiography, an emerging technology that is based on the measurement of the trajectories of cosmic ray muons that would undergo large multiple coulomb scattering upon passing through a large piece of uranium (the scattering is significantly enhanced in materials with large atomic number).
It is likely that terrorists would view the plutonium residing in spent fuel rods as a promising weapons material. They would need to steal the rods from a commercial facility, and process them with well known, albeit hazardous, chemical procedures to separate the plutonium from the uranium. Then they could make a crude device, with probably much less destructive power than the World War II weapons, but nevertheless with sufficient destructive capacity to achieve the goals of terrorism. Chemical separation is much easier than isotopic separation for heavy elements making Rpu much more preferable than natural uranium. The first nuclear reactors were made for the purpose of producing plutonium for this very reason. Fortunately plutonium is much more radioactive than uranium, making it much easier to detect a smuggled plutonium device than a uranium device. A 4 kg Wpu weapon with tungsten tamper yields 1600 gamma rays per second, and 400,000 neutrons per second. It is estimated in [7] that the distance for which gamma ray background equals the signal from such a weapon is about 60 cm, and the corresponding distance for neutrons is 25 meters. Although plutonium may be the easiest material to acquire and configure into a crude nuclear weapon, it is also the easiest to detect by passive radiation monitoring. It seems evident that an essential tool in the arsenal of weapons to fight nuclear terrorism must include a network of sensitive neutron detectors to reduce to the absolute minimum the possibility of smuggling plutonium into the United States, or out of any other country. Knowledge of this defense would narrow the terrorists' options, making it easier to focus anti-terrorist activities in those areas they are forced to turn to. We here describe a device with inherently superior neutron detection sensitivity that could contribute to the overall effort against nuclear terrorism.
DETECTOR CONCEPT
To improve the sensitivity of the identification of a plutonium neutron source in the presence of cosmic ray background requires a distinguishing characteristic. The principal differences are energy spectrum and angular distribution of arrival directions. Since the sources have similar energy spectra and since it is difficult to measure neutron energies accurately the angular distribution is the better of the two options. This eliminates the use of moderators to thermalize the neutrons prior to detection (which can improve detection efficiency since many materials have thermal neutron capture cross sections that are quite large). Elastic scattering tends to dominate cross sections in the fission spectrum energy range. The recoil direction of a struck nucleus cannot be backwards. Thus, by measuring the direction and energy of recoil nuclei, one gains important information about the location of the source. It is well known that the energy transferred to a nucleus of atomic weight A in an elastic collision with a neutron is
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In this equation, TA is the kinetic energy of the recoil nucleus, Tn is the kinetic energy of the neutron, and 0 is the scattering angle of the neutron in the center of mass frame of reference. The recoil angle of the struck nucleus in the lab frame, relative to the neutron's initial direction, is
If the scattering is isotropic in the center of mass frame, then the distribution of recoil energies is uniform from 0 to the maximum. However, this is not always the case. For example Figure 1 shows the properties of neutron-He-4 elastic scattering for a neutron energy of 0.84 MeV. [8] .
One sees that the maximum energy recoils occur more often than low energy recoils, indicating that on the average the direction of the recoil nucleus is better correlated with initial neutron direction than for the isotropic scattering case. Helium also has the beneficial feature of being light and therefore capable of absorbing a large fraction of the neutron's energy.
A novel approach to the search for dark matter with the use of a time-projection-chamber with optical readout is described in [9] . A detector based on this principal is shown in Figure 2 .
The detector uses CF4 with a mesh amplification plane in a large drift cell. CF4 has small electron diffusion and is an excellent scintillator. Recoil nuclei leave trails of ionized electrons that drift to the amplification plane, where gas multiplication takes place. The associated scintillation is measured, revealing the projection of the recoil track on the mesh amplification plane. A photomultiplier tube measures the time profile, permitting a three dimensional reconstruction of the track. A photograph of tracks from an alpha particle source is shown in Figure 3 .
Ftigure 2 -optical readout time-projection chamber; the ccd camera is at the bottom of the chamber and a photomultiplier tube is attached to the side and measures the time profile of the pulses; also shown are pumps, filters, cold traps and pressure regulators for controlled flow. 
PERFORMANCE
We assume a gas mixture of 95% helium -5% CF4 by pressure, with an absolute pressure of 3 bars. Elastic cross sections for the fission spectrum are of the order of several barns for each type of nucleus, so the total scattering will be dominated by helium. The elastic neutron cross section for He-4 is 8 barns at 1 MeV, and falls to 2 barns at 6 MeV, and to 1 barn at 0.5 MeV. It is well-matched to the fission spectrum. The image features of the scintillating timeprojection-chamber will be unmistakable for a point source of fission neutrons the order of 10 to 20 meters away from the detector. The tracks will be aligned with a line to the source. The distribution of the lengths of the tracks will confirm the rough features of the fission spectrum (the actual spectrum for the neutrons from the weapon is actually modified slightly compared to the fission spectrum). Furthermore, the scintillation intensity along the helium recoil tracks will vary along the tracks in such a way to determine the direction of motion of the recoil nucleus. This will allow a reasonably accurate determination of the actual location of the weapon. For a 3 bar mixture of 95% helium -5% CF4, the mean free path for a fission neutron in the gas will be about 24 meters. For a cubic meter chamber, the detection efficiency will be 4%. The detection rate of neutrons from a 4 kg Wpu core weapon would be 3/second at a distance of 20 meters. The rate would be 5 times larger than this for a Rpu weapon. The rate of detection of cosmic neutrons in the 1 to 10 MeV range will be several per second for the same detector. For MeV cosmic neutrons, the flux is approximately isotropic, with about twice as many moving down as up.
In just a matter of several seconds then, there should be a significant number of recoil helium tracks pointing back to the weapon that would distinguish these neutrons from the cosmic background.
A number of R&D issues must be resolved before this device can become practical: 1) to make it cost effective requires the development of lowcost ccd cameras since a cubic meter chamber will require about 32 cameras; the Boston University Electronics Design Facility has produced a design and a prototype camera is being built that will be tested soon;
2) it must be shown that the proposed gas mixture works; we have tested 50-50 mixtures of helium and CF4 at 600 torr, and find no change in the performance compared to pure 300 torr CF4 so we do not expect this to be a problem;
3) we need to complete the prototype chamber shown in Figure 2 (the full size field cage is just being installed) so that we can measure the cosmic ray neutron properties as a demonstration of our ability to measure low fluxes of neutrons (we have calibrated another prototype with 14 MeV neutrons from a neutron generator and with Cf-252 fission neutrons, so we do not expect this to be a problem).
device compensate for its rather poor detection efficiency, which is characteristic of gas neutron detectors.
Ultimately the prospects for this device will rely on its cost and its performance. To deal with the nuclear terror threat will require a very large number of detectors around the world, and this will not be possible unless they are relatively cheap, and easy to use, and reliable. These are essentially the same requirements for the dark matter application of the same technique, so the R&D for the neutron detection activity is synergistic with that for the dark matter activity. The work to develop these detectors thus proceeds in parallel.
